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ENFORCING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BY IMPOSING 
UNILATERAL SECONDARY SANCTIONS: IS MIGHT 
RIGHT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
 
Patrick C. R. Terry† 
 
Abstract: Following the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the 
agreement between the five permanent UN Security Council members, the European 
Union, Germany, and Iran, that intends to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, 
the United States has re-imposed and tightened its sanctions against Iran. The United 
States’ renunciation of the agreement, despite the agreement’s UN Security Council 
approval and verified Iranian compliance, arguably violated international law. 
Nevertheless, the United States is attempting to compel the other state parties (and 
others) to follow its policy on Iran by threatening those states’ companies and business 
executives with economic or even criminal sanctions to force them to cut commercial 
ties with Iran. 
Based on an in-depth discussion of the lawfulness of such secondary 
sanctions under public international law, this article concludes that secondary 
sanctions, as imposed by the United States more recently, are unlawful. The United 
States’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not justified under any principle of 
jurisdiction recognized in customary international law. In fact, the international 
community explicitly rejects the United States’ claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the United States seeks to undermine third states’ foreign and trade 
policies by targeting their citizens and businesses. United States’ sanctions policy is 
thus an attempt to assert control over other states’ foreign policies. This coercion 
amounts to an unlawful intervention into those states’ internal affairs. Lastly, the use 
of the United States’ superior economic power to strong-arm other states into 
abandoning their own foreign policy is a violation of the sovereign equality principle. 
 
 Cite as: Patrick C. R. Terry, Enforcing U.S. Foreign Policy by Imposing 
Unilateral Secondary Sanctions: Is Might Right in Public International Law?, 30 
WASH. INT’L L.J. 1 (2020). 
 
The Act has been widely seen by foreign governments…as an unwelcome and 
objectionable attempt to substitute the foreign and trade policies of the United States’ 
Congress for those of foreign sovereign governments.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Unilaterally imposing economic sanctions against other states has 
become an increasingly popular policy tool worldwide. There are two 
reasons for this trend. First, the imposition of multilateral sanctions 
mandated by the United Nations’ (UN) Security Council under Article 41 
UN Charter is rare due to severe disagreements between the five permanent 
members when assessing whether a particular situation poses a threat to 
 
†  Patrick C. R. Terry is the Dean of the Faculty of Law and a Professor of Law at the University 
of Public Administration in Kehl (Germany). I would like to thank the editorial staff at the Washington 
International Law Journal for their helpful suggestions. 
1  Nicholas Davidson, First Secretary (Trade Policy), British Embassy, Washington D.C., U.S. 
Secondary Sanctions: the U.K. and EU Response, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1425, 1432 (1998) (referring to 
the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, targeting Cuba). 
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peace.2  Second, many argue that resorting to economic sanctions is a 
preferable course of action to using force, which in some cases appears to 
be the only viable alternative to economic sanctions.3 Whether the frequent 
imposition of sanctions was or is effective in achieving the desired change 
of behavior of target states is contentious.4 Nevertheless, the United States 
is especially inclined to pursue this strategy and frequently reverts to 
unilateral economic sanctions to force target states to change their 
policies.5  
As globalization has progressed, the world has witnessed the rise of 
several major economic powers besides the United States, such as China, 
the European Union, and—to some extent—India.6 This emergence of an 
economically multipolar world has occurred against the backdrop of 
mounting and increasingly frequent policy disagreements even between 
allied states during the Cold War.7 Accordingly, the United States’ ability 
to influence the conduct of target states by imposing unilateral sanctions 
has diminished. Rather, third states often do not follow the United States’ 
lead in imposing such sanctions, 8  but instead, attempt to exploit the 
 
2  See generally Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., The UN Security Council in an Age of Great 
Power Rivalry, (United Nations Univ. Working Paper No. 04, 2015), https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/
UNU:6112/UNSCAgeofPowerRivalry.pdf; see, e.g., Patrick Wintour, UN Security Council Rejects US 
Attempt to Extend Iran Sanctions, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/25/iran-sanctions-trump-administration-un-security-
council. 
3  Farshad Ghodoosi, The Trump Effect: Assertive Foreign Policy through Extraterritorial 
Application of Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101, 102 (2019); Jacob L. Lew & Richard Nephew, 
The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2018, at 139; Deborah Senz & 
Hilary Charlesworth, Building Blocks: Australia’s Response to Foreign Extraterritorial Legislation, 2 
MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2001). 
4  Timothy S. Dunning, D’Amato in a China Shop: Problems of Extraterritoriality with the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 169, 191–94, 195–97 (1998); Oliver C. 
Dziggel, The Reagan Pipeline Sanctions: Implications for U.S. Domestic Policy and the Future of 
International Law, 50 TOWSON U. J. INT’L AFF. 129, 129–30, 137 (2016); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second 
Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 915–16 (2009). 
5  LAURENT HOFF, TRANSAKTIONEN IN US-DOLLAR UND SEKUNDÄRE SANKTIONEN, IST DIE US-
AMERIKANISCHE PRAXIS MIT DEM VÖLKERRECHT VEREINBAR? 33–34 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: 
Baden-Baden 2019); Michael P. Malloy, Où est votre chapeau? Economic Sanctions and Trade 
Regulation, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371, 371 (2003); Meyer, supra note 4, at 912–15; Currently, the United 
States is implementing 34 “active sanctions programs”; Sanctions Programs and Country Information, 
DEP’T OF THE TREAS., https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
6  Globalisation and the EU economy, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-economic-
relations/globalisation-and-eu-economy_en (last visited Dec. 2, 2020); Peter S. Goodman, 
Globalization is Moving Past the U.S. and Its Vision of World Order, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/business/globalization-us-world-order.html. 
7  Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade 
Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 6 (1998). As for sanctions targeting Iran, see, e.g., Robin Emmott 
et al., China and India Seen as Europe’s Last Hope to Save Iran Deal, REUTERS (May 9, 2019), 
https://jp.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSKCN1SF1RB. 
8  Dziggel, supra note 4, at 150; Meyer, supra note 4, at 917–24. 
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business opportunities created by the United States’ withdrawal. 9 
Therefore, not only does the United States risk failure in achieving its 
policy objectives, but United States’ businesses are losing out to foreign 
competitors whose governments do not prohibit or restrict trade with states 
targeted by the United States.10 
As a result, the United States has increasingly reverted to imposing 
secondary sanctions against actors in third states that continue to trade with 
target states.11 The United States had always taken an expansive view of 
its right to regulate foreign persons’ conduct in another state, especially by 
targeting permanent (foreign) residents even when they were acting 
abroad.12 But it was only in the 1980s that United States’ sanctions policies 
became unacceptably intrusive. 13  In 1982, President Ronald Reagan 
extended United States’ sanctions against the Soviet Union to include 
foreign subsidiaries of United States’ companies and all companies 
operating under a United States’ export license.14 Massive pressure by 
other states led the United States’ government to abandon these 
 
9  Charles Tait Graves, Extraterritoriality and Its Limits: The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 
1996, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 715, 718 (1998); Meyer, supra note 4, at 906. 
10  Graves, supra note 9, at 716, 718, 741; Meyer, supra note 4, at 906; Susan Emmenegger, 
Extraterritorial Economic Sanctions and Their Foundation in International Law, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMPAR. L. 631, 657 (2016). 
11  HOFF, supra note 5, at 99; Dunning, supra note 4, at 184; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 28; ELLIE 
GERANMAYEH & MANUEL LAFONT RAPNOUIL, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., MEETING THE 
CHALLENGE OF SECONDARY SANCTIONS 2 (June 2019); Kristina Larsson, United States Extraterritorial 
Application of Economic Sanctions and the New International Sanctions on Iran 51 (2011) (Master 
thesis, Lund University) (Semantic Scholar); Meyer, supra note 4, at 924–25; JEAN DE RUYT, EGMONT 
ROYAL INST. FOR INT’L REL., EUR. POL’Y BRIEF NO. 54, AMERICAN SANCTIONS AND EUROPEAN 
SOVEREIGNTY 4 (Feb. 2019); Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 3; SASCHA LOHMANN, BERLIN: 
STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK (SWP) DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK UND 
SICHERHEIT [GERMAN INST. FOR INT’L AND SEC. AFF.], SWP COMMENT NO. 5, EXTRATERRITORIAL U.S. 
SANCTIONS: ONLY DOMESTIC COURTS COULD EFFECTIVELY CURB THE ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. LAW 
ABROAD 4 (Feb. 2019); Seyed Yaser Ziaee, Jurisdictional Countermeasures Versus Extraterritoriality 
in International Law, 4 RUSS. L. J. 27, 28 (2016). 
12  See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6010); Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (June 28, 2005); Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(a) (2020). Both Hoff and Davidson view this practice as unlawful. 
See HOFF, supra note 5, at 141; Davidson, supra note 1, 1426; contra Werner Meng, Völkerrechtliche 
Zulässigkeit und Grenzen wirtschaftsverwaltungsrechtlicher Hoheitsakte mit Auslandswirkung, 44 
MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 
675, at 753 (1984) (Ger.) (arguing that such an extension of jurisdiction is justified). 
13  Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial 
Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 111 (2010); Austen Parrish, The Interplay Between 
Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Foundations of International Law, in STANDARDS AND 
SOVEREIGNS: LEGAL HISTORIES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY (Umut Özsu, Dan Margolies, Maïa Pal, and 
Ntina Tzouvala, eds., forthcoming 2017). 
14  Vaughan Lowe, US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts, 46 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 378, 378 (1997); HOFF, supra note 5, at 108–09; Dunning, supra note 4, at 184–85; 
Graves, supra note 9, at 730–31; Malloy, supra note 5, at 376; Meng, supra note 12, at 678–82; Meyer, 
supra note 4, at 927; RICHARD NEPHEW, TRANSATLANTIC SANCTIONS POLICY: FROM THE 1982 SOVIET 
GAS PIPELINE EPISODE TO TODAY 8–13 (Columbia Sch. Int’l and Pub. Affairs Ctr on Glob. Energy 
Policy, 2019). 
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sanctions. 15  Nonetheless, in 1996, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD), more commonly known as the Helms-
Burton Act,16 and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), sometimes 
referred to as the D’Amato Act, came into effect.17 These Acts aimed to 
prevent foreign investments in Cuba, Iran, and Libya by targeting business 
and individuals in third states.18  Following World Trade Organization 
(WTO) proceedings by Canada and European states, among others, the 
United States compromised again.19 
Under President Donald Trump, the United States was once more 
aggressively pursuing sanctions that equate its purported right to 
unilaterally impose sanctions on other states with a right to compel third 
states to act similarly.20 The United States unilaterally withdrew from the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which is the agreement 
between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the 
European Union, Germany, and Iran that intended to stop Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons.21 Instead, the United States has re-imposed and 
tightened its sanctions against Iran.22 The United States’ renunciation of 
JCPOA, despite the agreement’s UN Security Council approval and 
verified Iranian compliance, 23  arguably violated international law. 24 
Nevertheless, the United States is attempting to compel other states to 
 
15  HOFF, supra note 5, at 109; Dunning, supra note 4, at 184–85; Malloy, supra note 5, at 376; 
Meng, supra note 12, at 678–82; Meyer, supra note 4, at 927; NEPHEW, supra note 14, at 8–13. 
16  Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 602.  
17  Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 
18  Lowe, supra note 14, at 379–83, 385–86; Dunning, supra note 4, at 169, 173, 188. 
19  HOFF, supra note 5, at 110; Harry L. Clark, Dealing with US Extraterritorial Sanctions and 
Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 87–92, (1999); Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 
14; Graves, supra note 9, at 721–25, 731–32; Meyer, supra note 4, at 928–29; NEPHEW, supra note 14, 
at 22; Cedric Ryngaert, Extraterritorial Export Controls (Secondary Boycotts), 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 
625, 645–48 (2008). 
20  Lew & Nephew, supra note 3, at 146–47; HOFF, supra note 5, at 99; GERANMAYEH & 
RAPNOUIL, supra note 11, at 2; DE RUYT, supra note 11, at 4; C. Joy Gordon, The U.S. Embargo Against 
Cuba and the Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterritoriality, 36 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 63, 69 (2012) 
(referring to the embargo on trade with Cuba that was first imposed in 1961). 
21  Memorandum on Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to 
Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOCS. No. 201800310 (May 8, 2018). 
22  For the re-imposition of sanctions, see Statement from the President on the Reimposition of 
United States Sanctions with Respect to Iran, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. No. 201800523 (Aug. 6, 2018); 
for new sanctions, see, e.g., Statement from President Donald J. Trump Regarding Imposing Sanctions 
with Respect to the Iron, Steel, Aluminum, and Copper Sectors of Iran, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS., No. 
201900282 (May 8, 2019); Edward Wong, Trump Imposes New Sanctions on Iran, Adding to Tensions, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/us/politics/iran-sanctions.html; Lew 
& Nephew, supra note 3, at 146–47. 
23  S.C. Res. 2231, ¶ 15 (July 20, 2015); Press Release, Aabha Dixit, Int’l Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), Iran is Implementing Nuclear-Related JCPOA Commitments, Director General Amano Tells 
IAEA Board, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/i
ran-is-implementing-nuclear-related-jcpoa-commitments-director-general-amano-tells-iaea-board. 
24  Marcin J. Menkes, The Legality of US Investment Sanctions Against Iran Before the ICJ: A 
Watershed Moment for the Essential Security and Necessity Exceptions, 56 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 328, 328–
29, 331, 339–43, 358 (2018). 
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follow its sanctions and foreign policy.25 For example, the United States 
has threatened European, Chinese, and other states’ companies to force 
them to cut their commercial ties with Iran.26 President Donald Trump has 
also threatened France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with the 
imposition of onerous tariffs on certain exports to the United States, should 
they not toe the United States’ line on Iran.27  
This article examines the lawfulness of such secondary sanctions 
under public international law. Unilateral secondary sanctions differ from 
unilateral primary sanctions in that secondary sanctions are not directed 
against the target state but rather against individuals and businesses in third 
states (and possibly now also third states themselves) that continue to trade 
with the primary target state.28 Thus, the imposition of secondary sanctions 
aims to compel third state nationals to follow United States rather than their 
own state’s policies.29 
Although controversial,30 many view the unilateral imposition of 
primary sanctions against a target state as a lawful exercise of state 
sovereignty.31 Every state has the right to decide whether it wants to initiate 
or continue economic relations with another state.32 Secondary sanctions, 
however, raise a different legal issue. By imposing secondary sanctions 
against individuals and businesses in third states, the sanctioning state 
asserts a right to regulate conduct that does not take place within its 
 
25  Krishnadev Calamur, Trump Goes from Threatening Iran to Threatening the World, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/trump-iran-
tweet/566948/; US-Botschafter Grenell droht Europäern, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.dw.com/de/us-botschafter-grenell-droht-europ%C3%A4ern/a-47444986. 
26  Michael Peel, US Warns European Companies Not to Defy Iran Sanctions, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/f6edbfc8-b1ec-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c; Benedict Neff, 
US-Botschafter in Berlin schreibt Drohbriefe an deutsche Firmen, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Ger.) (Jan. 
13, 2019), https://www.nzz.ch/international/us-botschafter-in-berlin-schreibt-drohbriefe-an-deutsche-
firmen-ld.1451130; Lew & Nephew, supra note 3, at 146–47. 
27  David Charter, Punish Iran or Face US Tariffs, Trump Told European Nations, TIMES (Jan. 16, 
2020), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/punish-iran-or-face-us-tariffs-trump-told-european-nations-
v3r5tdbrl; Josh Barrie, Donald Trump Threatened UK, France and Germany With Tariffs to Secure 
Support on Iran, INEWS (Jan. 16, 2020), https://inews.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-uk-france-
germany-tariffs-cars-iran-support-nuclear-agreement-1367645.  
28  HOFF, supra note 5, at 31, 105–07; Annamaria Viterbo, Extraterritorial Sanctions and 
International Economic Law, in BUILDING BRIDGES: CENTRAL BANKING LAW IN AN INTERCONNECTED 
WORLD, ECB LEGAL CONFERENCE DECEMBER 2019 157, 161 (Eur. Cent. Bank, 2019); Cécile Fabre, 
Secondary Economic Sanctions, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, 2016, at 1, 3; Malloy, supra note 5, at 375–
76; Meyer, supra note 4, at 905, 926; Aarshi Tirkey, US Secondary Sanctions: Framing an Appropriate 
Response for India, ORF ISSUE BRIEF 1 (Jan. 2019); Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 9. 
29  Viterbo, supra note 28, at 161; Graves, supra note 9, at 715; Meyer, supra note 4, at 926; Tirkey, 
supra note 28, at 2. 
30  Viterbo, supra note 28, at 157; Larsson, supra note 11, at 23–24. 
31  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 245, 276 (June 27); HOFF, supra note 5, at 126; Cristian DeFrancia, Enforcing the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime: The Legality of Preventive Measures, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 705, 749 
(2012); Dunning, supra note 4, at 173, 183; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 88; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 
625; Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 7. 
32  Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
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territory.33 This raises the issue of whether this claim to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is compatible with international law or rather a violation of the 
third state’s sovereignty. 34  Furthermore, the sanctioning state seeks to 
impose its foreign policy on a third state by forcing third state nationals 
and businesses to respect the sanctioning state’s policies instead of the third 
state’s.35 As such, secondary sanctions may well violate the principle of 
sovereign equality and constitute an unlawful intervention in the third 
state’s internal affairs.36 
The United States’ secondary sanctions are indeed unlawful under 
public international law.37 The United States’ assertion of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is not justified under any principle of jurisdiction recognized 
in customary international law. In fact, the international community 
explicitly rejects the United States’ claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the United States seeks to undermine third states’ foreign and 
trade policies by targeting their citizens and businesses. United States’ 
sanctions policy is thus an attempt to assert control over other states’ 
foreign policies. Such coercion, however, amounts to an unlawful 
intervention in those states’ internal affairs. Lastly, the use of the United 
States’ vast economic power to force other states to abandon their own 
foreign policy is a violation of the sovereign equality principle.38 
I. UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
IS A VIOLATION OF THIRD STATES’ SOVEREIGNTY 
The way the United States utilizes secondary sanctions in order to 
target the conduct of non-residents who are lawfully engaged in business 
transactions taking place outside of the United States, violates other states’ 
sovereignty. The United States is thereby overruling those states’ sovereign 
decisions to permit certain transactions on their territory. To demonstrate 
the full implications of the United States’ current understanding of the 
extraterritorial application of its sanctions laws, it is useful to briefly 
summarize two recent cases involving non-U.S. citizens who were indicted 
by United States’ authorities mainly based on their conduct abroad.  
The first case concerns a Turkish executive named Reza Zarrab. In 
2016, United States’ authorities arrested him while on holiday in Florida 
 
33  DeFrancia, supra note 31, at 751; Larsson, supra note 11, at 24. 
34  HOFF, supra note 5, at 129; Developments in the Law – Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. 
REV., 1226, 1228 (2011); Meyer, supra note 13, at 145. 
35  See Calamur, supra note 25. 
36  HOFF, supra note 5, at 132–36 (discussing the possibility), 170, 172; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, 
at 15, 35; Meng, supra note 12, at 747–50; Tirkey, supra note 28, at 2, 9. 
37  For a different view, see generally Dunning, supra note 4, at 184 (arguing secondary sanctions 
do not violate customary international law while disputing their effectiveness); Fabre, supra note 28. 
38  This article does not consider the lawfulness of unilateral primary sanctions against a target 
state or international economic, investment, or trade law. 
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for violating United States’ sanctions laws.39 A resident and citizen of 
Turkey, Reza Zarrab, had been involved in Turkish efforts to purchase 
Iranian gas in exchange for Turkish lira paid into an account held at a 
Turkish bank.40 Due to United States’ sanctions, it was difficult for the 
Iranian government to access the money deposited in Turkey. 41  Reza 
Zarrab participated in a scheme, which enabled the conversion of this 
money into gold via the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), thereby enabling 
the Iranian government to access the Turkish payments for gas.42 In doing 
so, Reza Zarrab did not violate Turkish, U.A.E. or Iranian laws. 43 
Nevertheless, a United States court held that the arrest of Reza Zarrab was 
justified.44 Inter alia, Reza Zarrab was accused of violating United States’ 
sanctions laws because on various occasions, money transferred between 
some of the foreign actors had been cleared in the United States, even 
though the money was to benefit the Iranian government. U.S. banks, 
where the involved foreign banks held correspondent accounts, had 
therefore unwittingly violated United States’ sanctions laws. 45 
Furthermore, Reza Zarrab had circumvented the United States’ prohibition 
on payments to the Iranian government and the export of precious metals 
to Iran by actively participating in the scheme just outlined.46 
The second, more recent case, involves a Chinese citizen. In 
December 2018, Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer, was 
arrested in Canada based on a United States arrest warrant.47 Inter alia, 
United States’ authorities are accusing Meng Wanzhou of providing 
incorrect information to banks with U.S. subsidiaries on the China-based 
Huawei’s links to a Hong Kong-based company called Skycom.48 Skycom 
allegedly attempted to sell U.S. origin goods to Iranian mobile phone 
 
39  Dexter Filkins, A Mysterious Case involving Turkey, Iran, and Rudi Giuliani, THE NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-mysterious-case-involving-
turkey-iran-and-rudy-giuliani; LOHMANN, supra note 11, at 6. 
40  Susan Emmenegger & Thirza Döbeli, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Sanctions Law, 
in US LITIGATION TODAY: STILL A THREAT FOR EUROPEAN BUSINESSES OR JUST A PAPER TIGER? 231, 
232 (Andrea Bonomi & Krista N. Schefer eds., 2018). 
41  Superseding Indictment at 1–2, United States v. Zarrab, No. 15 Cr 867 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. June 
16, 2016) [hereinafter Superseding Indictment Against Zarrab]. 
42  Id. at 16–22. 
43  Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 240. 
44  Id. at 241–44. 
45  Superseding Indictment Against Zarrab, supra note 41, at 29–40; Emmenegger & Döbeli, 
supra note 40, at 235, 236–37, 240–41. 
46  Superseding Indictment Against Zarrab, supra note 41, at 6–9, 29–40.  
47  Julie Gordon & Steve Stecklow, U.S. Accuses Huawei CFO of Iran Sanctions Cover-up; 
Hearing Adjourned, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-huawei/u-
s-accuses-huawei-cfo-of-iran-sanctions-cover-up-hearing-adjourned-idUSKBN1O60FY; Superseding 
Indictment at 1–2, United States v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 18 Cr 457 (AMD) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 
2019) [hereinafter Superseding Indictment against Meng]. 
48  Superseding Indictment Against Meng, supra note 47, at 3–4, 6–8, 10–14; Gordon & 
Stecklow, supra note 47. 
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companies in violation of U.S. sanctions.49 According to United States’ 
authorities, Skycom was actually a subsidiary of Huawei, created in order 
to conduct business with Iran.50  By not being truthful about Huawei’s 
connections to Skycom, Meng Wanzhou allegedly induced a number of 
banks to enter into transactions with Huawei, despite the latter’s violation 
of United States’ sanctions laws. 51  China has denounced the arrest, 
strongly indicating that Meng Wanzhou did not violate Chinese laws 
during the contentious transactions.52 The United States, nevertheless, is 
demanding Meng Wanzhou’s extradition from Canada, a demand she is 
contesting. The case is currently before the Canadian courts.53 
These two examples illustrate United States’ sanctions laws’ far-
reaching application. In both cases, non-United States citizens were 
indicted based on alleged offenses committed abroad where their conduct 
was legal. In both cases, the connection to the United States is at best 
tenuous. Nevertheless, the United States claims a right to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in both instances. This is in part based on Executive Order 
13608 of May 2012 which banned “certain transactions with” and the 
“entry” of “foreign sanction evaders with respect to Iran and Syria.”54 The 
United States’ Department of the Treasury argued that this Executive Order 
enables it to respond to the “behavior of foreign persons” even “where the 
foreign person had no physical, financial, or other presence in the United 
States and did not submit to U.S. administrative proceedings.” 55 
Consequently, “the sanctioned individual or entity” would “be cut off from 
the U.S. commercial and financial systems.”56 
 Thus, the United States is claiming the right to prohibit specific 
behavior of third state citizens, which occurs on the territory of those third 
states where, moreover, such behavior may not only be lawful, but possibly 
even encouraged.57 The question that arises in this context is whether the 
 
49  Superseding Indictment Against Meng, supra note 47, at 5; Gordon & Stecklow, supra 
note 47. 
50  Superseding Indictment Against Meng, supra note 47, at 2. 
51  Gordon & Stecklow, supra note 47. 
52  Jo Kim, The Meng Wanzhou Case Speaks to China’s Diplomatic Paranoia, THE DIPLOMAT 
(June 2, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/the-meng-wanzhou-case-speaks-to-chinas-diplomatic-
paranoia/; ‘Pathetic Clown’: Chinese State-Backed Media Attacks Canada After Meng Wanzhou 
Ruling, NAT’L POST (May 28, 2020), https://nationalpost.com/news/world/pathetic-clown-chinese-
state-backed-media-attacks-canada-after-meng-wanzhou-verdict. 
53  Moira Warburton, Timeline: Key Events in Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou’s Extradition Case, 
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-usa-events-timeline/key-
events-in-huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhous-extradition-case-idUSKBN27C3C9?il=0. 
54  Exec. Order No. 13,608, 3 C.F.R. § 13608 (2012). 
55 FAQ 192: Iran Sanctions, Executive Order 13608, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/192. 
56  Id. 
57  Michael Nesbitt, Canada’s ‘Unilateral’ Sanctions Regime Under Review: Extraterritoriality, 
Human Rights, Due Process, and Enforcement in Canada’s Special Economic Measures Act, 48 
OTTAWA L. R., 513, 539, 546 (2016); HOFF, supra note 5, at 129, 165; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 9. 
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United States’ attitude to its jurisdiction to prescribe violates those third 
states’ sovereignty.58 
Although it is difficult to provide an exact definition of 
“sovereignty” as understood in public international law,59 there is general 
agreement that sovereignty includes a state’s right to demand respect for 
its territorial integrity and political independence.60 As early as 1949, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stressed the importance of the concept 
of sovereignty: “between independent states, respect for territorial 
sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.” 61 
Territorial sovereignty includes a state’s right to govern effectively to 
exclude other states on its territory.62 Consequently, no state has the right 
to exercise governmental functions on another state’s territory without that 
state’s permission. 63  In the Las Palmas Case, a dispute between the 
Netherlands and the United States concerning sovereignty over an island, 
the arbitrator at the Permanent Court of Arbitration explained that 
sovereignty “signifies independence.64  Independence, with regards to a 
portion of the globe, is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other State, the functions of a State.” 65 
In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
underlined the importance of respecting another state’s sovereignty 
specifically in the context of jurisdiction when it declared that “the first 
and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that—
failing a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in 
 
58  William S. Dodge, Jurisdictional Reasonableness Under Customary International Law: The 
Approach of the Restatement (Fourth) of US Foreign Relations Law, 62 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 5, 7, 12; 
Graves, supra note 9, at 733; Meyer, supra note 13, at 145; Dunning, supra note 4, at 908; Meng, supra 
note 12, at 727–28; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 638; HOFF, supra note 5, at 129; Developments in 
the Law, Extraterritoriality, supra note 34, at 1228. 
59  See MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATE SUCCESSION 
AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 7–92 (2007); see also Karen Knop, Cambridge: CUP, Diversity and Self-
Determination in International Law, 109-211 (2002); Antony Anghie, Cambridge: CUP, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, (2005). 
60  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; League of Nations Covenant art. 10. 
61  See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 35 (Apr. 4). 
62  See S. S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
63  See France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18–19; see also Hans Morgenthau, The Problem of 
Sovereignty Reconsidered, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 344 (1948); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Legal 
Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace, in 4TH INT’L CONF. ON CYBER CONFLICT 7, 8 
(Christian Czosseck et al. eds., 2012); Pal Wrange, Intervention in National and Private Cyber Space 
and International Law, in THE FOURTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF THE ASIAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 5 (2013); Russell J. Buchan, The International Legal Regulation of State-
Sponsored Cyber Espionage, in INTERNATIONAL CYBER NORMS: LEGAL, POLICY & INDUSTRY 
PERSPECTIVE 65, 68–86 (Anna- Maria Osula, Henry Roigas eds., Tallinn, 2016). 
64  The Island of Palmas Case was decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration between the 
Netherlands and the United States. Spain had ceded the island to the United States, but the Netherlands 
claimed sovereignty over the island. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, https://pca-
cpa.org/en/cases/94/. 
65  Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1982).  
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any form in the territory of another state.”66 Regarding jurisdiction, the 
PCIJ added that “it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory 
except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or 
from a convention.”67 
In 1996, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, too, confirmed 
that “the State may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
another State. Under international law, the basic premise for establishing 
legislative and judicial jurisdiction is rooted in the principle of 
territoriality.”68 
As the two cases outlined above demonstrate, however, the United 
States is increasingly exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction by asserting a 
right to regulate conduct that takes place on the territory of other states. In 
the case of Reza Zarrab, the fact that United States banks acted as 
correspondent banks during business transactions that occurred abroad was 
deemed sufficient to indict a non-United States citizen on the grounds that 
United States’ sanctions laws were violated. 69  In the case of Meng 
Wanzhou, the sale abroad of products of U.S. origin by a foreign 
company’s (alleged) foreign subsidiary violated United States’ sanctions 
laws.70 It is doubtful that such a broad understanding of a state’s right to 
exercise jurisdiction is compatible with public international law. 
A. Jurisdiction under Customary International Law — Permissive Rules 
While many agree that some rules on jurisdictional rules have been 
incorporated into customary international law,71 the rules’ precise contours 
are at times contentious.72 A rule of customary international law exists 
when sufficient state practice and states have justified their practice by 
referring to international law (opinio juris).73 Customary international law 
provides that every state has exclusive territorial jurisdiction, i.e., the right 
to regulate conduct on its territory.74 This is a core element of sovereignty. 
 
66  France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18–19. 
67  Id. 
68  Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., In Response to OAS Resolution of the Gen. Assembly of the Org., 
Entitled “Freedom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere,” AG/DOC.3375/96, reprinted in 35 
I.L.M. No. 5 at 1333 (1996). 
69  Superseding Indictment Against Zarrab, supra note 41, at 29. 
70  Superseding Indictment Against Meng, supra note 47, at 1. 
71  Dodge, supra note 58, at 6; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 644. 
72  Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 647–48, 650–51, 653. 
73  See North Continental Shelf (Ger./Den., Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 72, ¶ 73–74 
(Feb. 20); see also Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, 
with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 124–126 (2018); Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
art. 38, § (1)(b); 141 CONG. REC. S15106 (1995) (“While the practice of states represents a source of 
international law, state practice makes law only when it is widespread, consistent and followed out of a 
sense of legal obligation.”). 
74  See Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., supra note 68, at 1333, ¶ 8(c); see also Mahir Al Banna, The 
Long Arm of US Jurisdiction and International Law: Extraterritoriality Against Sovereignty, 60 J. L. 
POL’Y & GLOBALIZATION 59, 62 (2017); Noah Bialostozky, Extraterritoriality and National Security: 
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Under the more expansive “subjective territoriality principle,” a state’s 
jurisdiction may also extend to a set of events that occurred partially 
abroad, if a substantial portion of the events took place on the state’s 
territory.75  
Nevertheless, United States’ sanctions laws go beyond even the 
most generous interpretation of the territoriality principle. The United 
States invokes the territoriality principle if its financial system is involved 
solely in the clearing process. 76  However, neither the use of U.S. 
correspondent banks by foreign banks during the course of complicated 
transactions taking place abroad nor the sale of U.S. products abroad 
provide a sufficient link to U.S. territory to justify territorial jurisdiction.77 
Under the “effects doctrine,” 78  a state can lawfully assert its 
jurisdiction if an action has direct and substantial effects on that state, 
irrespective of where it occurs.79 Originally developed in the context of 
antitrust law in the United States,80 the doctrine is now often accepted as a 
means of justifying a state’s jurisdiction. 81  However, it remains 
controversial whether the effects doctrine in fact has developed into a valid 
basis for claiming jurisdiction under customary international law.82  
 
Protective Jurisdiction as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness, 52 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 
617, 617–20 (2014); HOFF, supra note 5, at 100–01, 138–39; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 90; Larsson, 
supra note 11, at 25–26; Meyer, supra note 13, at 123, 143–44; Meyer, supra note 4, at 937; 
Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 645; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 247. 
75  Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., supra note 68, at 1333, ¶ 8(d); Larsson, supra note 11, at 26; 
Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 646–47; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 247. 
76  See, e.g., U.S. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5318A(e)(1)); HOFF, supra note 5, at 85–87; DE RUYT, supra note 11, at 4; Emmenegger & Döbeli, 
supra note 40, at 249. 
77  HOFF, supra note 5, at 139–40; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 655–56; Emmenegger & Döbeli, 
supra note 40, at 249; LOHMANN, supra note 11, at 7. 
78  The effects principle is described as an “aspect” of the territoriality principle. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1987); 
Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 247–48. 
79  Comments of the European Community on the Amendments of 22 June 1982 to the U.S. 
Export Regulations, at 9, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NEWS No. 23/1982 (Aug. 12, 1982), http://aei.pitt.ed
u/1768/1/US_dispute_comments_1982.pdf [hereinafter Comments of the European Community]; 141 
CONG. REC. S15106; Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., supra note 68; HOFF, supra note 5, at 162; Graves, 
supra note 9, at 716, 734–35; Meyer, supra note 13, at 147; Meng, supra note 12, at 751–52; Meyer, 
supra note 4, at 937; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 646–47; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 
250. 
80  Lowe, supra note 14, at 378; HOFF, supra note 5, at 148; Graves, supra note 9, at 734–35; 
Meyer, supra note 13, at 137–39; Meng, supra note 12, at 705–11; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 648, 
fn. 73; Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 13. For a detailed look at the evolution of the effects 
doctrine in the United States, see KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 93–125 (2009). 
81  RAUSTIALA, supra note 80, at 111–25; 141 CONG. REC. S15106; Emmenegger, supra note 10, 
at 648–49. 
82  Comments of the European Community, supra note 79, at 9; Al Banna, supra note 74, at 62; 
HOFF, supra note 5, at 147; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 90; Larsson, supra note 11, at 29, 52; 
Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 648–49, 656; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 247; Senz & 
Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 13. 
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Irrespective of whether states can successfully invoke the effects 
doctrine, it fails to justify the wide reach of United States’ sanctions laws. 
According to the United States’ expansive interpretation, its sanctions laws 
are already violated when two U.S. correspondent banks unknowingly 
enable the electronic transfer of monies as part of a sanctioned commercial 
transaction taking place abroad.83 However, such an electronic transfer has 
negligible, if any effect at all on the United States.84 This is, even more, the 
case when evaluating the sale of U.S. products abroad.85 Judge Meyer86 has 
correctly claimed that the United States is thus “prone to exaggerated 
claims that secondary sanctions measures can be justified by the protective 
or effects jurisdictional principles, even when these measures aim to 
redress … conduct that occurs in distant lands and that has no real prospect 
of jeopardizing the safety or of causing any substantial effect in the United 
States.”87 
As the quote from Judge Meyer suggests, some argue that U.S. 
sanctions laws, including their extraterritorial reach, are justified under the 
protective principle,88  a principle that is also viewed as related to the 
territoriality principle.89 Under the protective principle, a state can claim 
jurisdiction over matters that pose a substantial threat to its national 
security.90  This, however, does not justify jurisdiction based solely on 
divergent foreign policy goals.91 In 1982, this was confirmed by a Dutch 
 
83  See International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 110-96, 121 
Stat. 1011 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a)); Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 
31 C.F.R. § 560.203 (2020); HOFF, supra note 5, at 87–89; Developments in the Law – Extraterritoriality, 
supra note 34, 1251; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 636, 654; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, 
at 243–45. This policy is sometimes referred to as “Dollar unilateralism.” See generally, Suzanne 
Katzenstein, Dollar Unilateralism: The New Frontline of National Security, 90 IND. L. J. 293, 351 (2015). 
84  See HOFF, supra note 5, at 153 (regarding the Iran Sanctions Act), 162; Developments in the 
Law – Extraterritoriality, supra note 34, at 1251; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 657; Meyer, supra note 
4, at 941; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 250. 
85  Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 634. 
86  Currently a Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut; formerly, 
senior counsel to the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil for Food Program in 
Iraq (2004–05), a professor of law at Quinnipiac University School of Law and a visiting professor of 
law at Yale Law School. See Judge Meyer, Biography, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF 
CONNECTICUT, http://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/biography-district-judge-jeffrey-alker-meyer (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2020). 
87  Meyer, supra note 4, at 909. 
88  Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., supra note 68, at 1322, ¶ 8(f); Meyer, supra note 13, at 147; 
Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 651. 
89  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. d, f (AM. L. 
INST. 1987) (stating “[th]e protective principle may be seen as a special application of the effects 
principle,” which itself is seen as an “aspect” of the territoriality principle). 
90  Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., supra note 68, at 1322, ¶ 8(f); Al Banna, supra note 74, at 60; 
Bialostozky, supra note 74, 620–21, 622–23, 626, 631–36 (describing the abuse this jurisdictional 
principle is subject to); HOFF, supra note 5, at 153–54; Meyer, supra note 13, at 144; Meyer, supra note 
4, at 938; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 651–52; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 248. 
91  Dziggel, supra note 4, at 144–45. 
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court when addressing U.S. sanctions laws.92 While the court agreed that 
the protective principle allowed States “to exercise jurisdiction over acts—
wheresoever and by whomsoever performed—that jeopardize the security 
or creditworthiness of that State or other State interests,”93 it emphasized 
that “[s]uch other State interests do not include the foreign policy interest 
that the U.S. measure seeks to protect.”94 When invoking the protective 
principle, a state must be able to show how specific actions by others affect 
its security.95 As the ICJ stressed in Nicaragua v. United States, a mere 
claim that this is the case is insufficient.96 Furthermore, the protective 
principle does not justify the imposition of blanket secondary sanctions that 
ban all trade with the target state.97 Instead, under the protective principle, 
a state can only target those transactions that are actually related to the 
perceived national security threat.98 
 Both the exact scope of the protective principle and whether 
customary international law recognizes it as a valid justification for 
claiming jurisdiction is still disputed.99 Regardless, U.S. sanctions laws 
often do not meet even the necessary minimum requirements. 100  For 
example, the United States’ contention that Cuba is a meaningful threat to 
the United States’ national security is, far-fetched by any objective 
standard.101 The national security argument is also strained in the Iran case. 
Iran’s alleged attempts to acquire nuclear weapons pose a significant threat 
to U.S. national security, but this can only justify sanctions that target 
 
92  The Dutch District Court heard a dispute between a French and a Dutch company. The Dutch 
company had agreed to provide the French company with 2,400 strings of geophones with spare parts, 
which were to be exported to the Soviet Union. The Dutch company was a subsidiary of a United States 
corporation and subsequently informed the French company it would not deliver the goods to comply 
with the United States’ export embargo against the Soviet Union, imposed by the Reagan Administration. 
The French company subsequently sued the Dutch company, and the Hague District Court ruled in favor 
of it. For the details of the case, see Compagnie Européene des Pétroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., 
Case No. 82/716, Judgment, 22 I.L.M. 66, ¶ 1 (Dist. Ct., The Hague Sept. 17, 1982).  
93  Compagnie Européene des Pétroles, Case No. 82/716 ¶ 7.3.3, n.62 (Netherlands). 
94  Id. 
95  In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ indicated that it is opposed to an over-generous interpretation 
of what constitutes a threat to national security. When interpreting the term “essential security 
interests” (to be found in Article XXI (d) of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between Nicaragua and the United States, 367 UNTS 3 (1956)), it found that US claims of Nicaragua’s 
attempts at overthrowing neighboring states’ governments, which had allegedly been continuing for a 
couple of years, were not sufficient in order to rely on this exception, as the United States had not 
shown “how Nicaraguan policies had in fact become a threat to ‘essential security interests’” Nicaragua 
v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 282. 
96  Id. 
97  Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, 250–51; Meyer, supra note 4, 941. 
98  Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, 250–51; Meyer, supra note 4, 941. 
99  Comments of the European Community, supra note 79, at 9; Bialostozky, supra note 74, 620–
21, 626. 
100  Bialostozky, supra note 74, at 633–35; Menkes, supra note 24, at 333, 355–56; Ryngaert, supra 
note 19, at 633–34; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 658; Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 224. 
101  HOFF, supra note 5, at 154; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 642; Malloy, supra note 5, at 381 
(referring to how other nations view the United States’ invocation of “national security” with respect to 
Cuba within the World Trade Organization (WTO)). 
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transactions that are linked to the Weapons of Mass Destruction program 
(WMD).102 The United States’ sanctions against Iran that affect third states 
are undoubtedly much broader.103 Not even the United States has claimed 
that there is a link between the transactions prohibited under U.S. sanctions 
laws and the alleged attempts by Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.104 In fact, 
the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed sanctions 
against Iran, targeting third states, at a time when the International Atomic 
Energy Agency had already repeatedly certified that Iran was adhering to 
the agreement and not pursuing nuclear weapons.105 
Customary international law recognizes a state’s right to exert 
jurisdiction over its nationals even when acting abroad (“active personality 
principle”).106 This form of extraterritorial jurisdiction similarly fails to 
justify U.S. sanctions laws. The definition of persons under the United 
States’ jurisdiction, which includes permanent (foreign) residents in the 
United States, even when they are acting abroad,107 evidences an overly 
expansive view of the principle.108 Furthermore, the United States views 
foreign legal persons as bound by U.S. sanctions laws, if they are 
“controlled” by persons under the United States’ jurisdiction. 109  This 
presumption, however, cannot be reconciled with the “active personality 
principle.” There is widespread agreement within the international 
community that its registered head office or the laws under which it is 
organized determines the “nationality” of a legal person, and not the 
nationality of the persons controlling it.110 Similarly, the United States 
 
102  Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 642; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 658; Emmenegger & Döbeli, 
supra note 41, at 250–51. 
103  HOFF, supra note 5, at 155; Meyer, supra note 4, at 941; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 643, 650–
51; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 250–51. 
104  See Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 251; see also Superseding Indictment Against 
Zarrab, supra note 41 (the United States did not claim the transactions Zarrab was indicted for were 
linked to Iran’s nuclear weapon program); Superseding Indictment Against Meng, supra note 47 (no 
claimed link to Iran’s nuclear weapon program). 
105  Memorandum on Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to 
Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, supra note 21; Press 
Release, Aabha Dixit, Int’l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), supra note 24. 
106  Inter-Am. Juridical Comm., supra note 68, at 1322, ¶ 8(f); Al Banna, supra note 74, at 62; HOFF, 
supra note 5, at 140–41; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 90; Meyer, supra note 13, at 144; Meyer, supra note 
4, at 937; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 649–50; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 248. 
107  See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub.L. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6010); Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (June 28, 2005); Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(a) (2020). 
108  HOFF, supra note 5, at 141; Davidson, supra note 1, at 1426; contrast: Meng, supra note 12, at 
753 (arguing that such an extension of jurisdiction is justified). 
109  Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.329(d)–515.330(a)(4) (2020) (this being 
one example); Lowe, supra note 14, at 378; Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations 31 C.F.R. § 
560.537 (2020); HOFF, supra note 5, at 81–82, 141–46; Clark, supra note 19, at 457–58; Dunning, supra 
note 4, at 177, 183; Viterbo, supra note 28, at 160; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 649–50; Senz & 
Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
110  See Comments of the European Community, supra note 79, at 5–6; see also Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 41, 70, 88 (Feb. 5); Compagnie 
 
DECEMBER 2020 IS MIGHT RIGHT? 15 
 
extends sanctions to products of U.S. origin, 111  thereby presumably 
attempting to invoke the active personality principle based on the products’ 
U.S. “nationality.” 112  However, the international community does not 
assign nationality to goods and rejects attempts at exercising jurisdiction 
on that basis.113 
It remains controversial whether the so-called “passive personality 
principle,” whereby a state may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases 
when its nationals have been harmed, even if the relevant event occurred 
abroad, 114  has been accepted within the international community as a 
lawful exercise of jurisdiction.115  In any case, the principle would not 
justify the sweeping nature of the United States’ sanctions laws as they 
evidently apply to transactions that do not harm U.S. persons, as the Zarrab 
and Wanzhou cases illustrate.116 
The “universality principle” has been emerging as a new justification 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction, although not yet in the economic sphere.117 
According to the universality principle, a state can claim jurisdiction even 
for cases that have no connection to the state, if crimes were committed 
which the international community regards as particularly heinous, e.g., 
genocide,118 or which are considered “universal crimes,” e.g., piracy.119 
When the United States applies its sanctions laws, in most cases, it provides 
 
Européene des Pétroles, Case No. 82/716 ¶ 7.2 and 7.3.2, note 94 (Netherlands); Meng, supra note 12, 
at 733–34; HOFF, supra note 5, at 143–46; Clark, supra note 19, at 65; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 627–
29, 633; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 649–50; Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 7–8; LOHMANN, 
supra note 11, at 7; Ziaee, supra note 11, at 39–40; Meng, supra note 12, at 754–57 (expressing a nuanced 
view on the topic by concluding the American practice of forcing foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies 
to comply with U.S. foreign policy goals cannot be reconciled with public international law). See also 
Fruehauf Corporation v. Massardy Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May 22, 1965 
(Fr.), translated in 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966) (allowing French company Fruehauf Corporation to fulfill a 
contract with the People’s Republic of China under French law even though the company was majority-
owned by an American company and the U.S. Treasury ordered the cancellation of the contract). 
111  See Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560.205 (2020); Export 
Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 746.2(a) (2019); 15 C.F.R. § 746.7(a) (2020); Clark, supra note 
19, at 63–64, 462–65; Viterbo, supra note 28, at 159; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 43. 
112  Lowe, supra note 14, at 378; HOFF, supra note 5, at 84; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 42; Senz & 
Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 8; LOHMANN, supra note 11, at 7. 
113  Comments of the European Community, supra note 79, at 6; Lowe, supra note 14, at 378; Meng, 
supra note 12, at 756; Senz & Charlesworth, supra note 3, at 8. 
114  Meyer, supra note 13, at 144; Larsson, supra note 11, at 26; Meng, supra note 12, at 753–54; 
Meyer, supra note 4, at 938; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 643; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 650; 
Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 248. 
115  Meng, supra note 12, at 753–54; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 643; Emmenegger, supra note 10, 
at 650; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 248. 
116  See Superseding Indictment Against Zarrab, supra note 41; Superseding Indictment Against 
Meng, supra note 47. 
117  Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, at 251. 
118  HOFF, supra note 5, at 156–57; Meyer, supra note 13, at 144–45; Meyer, supra note 4, at 938; 
Larsson, supra note 11, at 26; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 653–54; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra 
note 40, at 248–49. 
119  Graves, supra note 9, at 736; Meyer, supra note 13, at 144–45; Dunning, supra note 4, at 938; 
Larsson, supra note 11, at 26; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 644; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 653–54; 
Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 41, at 248–49. 
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no evidence that the penalized transactions were related to heinous or 
universally accepted crimes.120 
In summary, the recent extraterritorial effect of the United States’ 
sanctions laws is not justified even if the more generous grounds justifying 
extraterritorial jurisdiction were invoked. The U.S. State Department came 
to a similar conclusion as far as the 1996 LIBERTAD Act was concerned, 
which included provisions that permitted lawsuits against foreigners 
“trafficking” expropriated property in Cuba that initially belonged to U.S. 
citizens.121 According to the U.S. State Department, the bill “would be very 
difficult to defend under international law” as “it would…make […] U.S. 
law applicable to, […], properties located in Cuba as to which there is no 
United States connection other than the current nationality of the owner of 
a claim to the property.” 122  Nevertheless, Congress ignored the State 
Department’s assessment.123  
 Given the breadth of the current sanctions on Iran and their 
extraterritorial effect, the impression that eminent British international law 
scholar, Vaughan Lowe, had of the less burdensome Helms-Burton and 
D’Amato Acts of 1996 seems more than justified now.124 According to 
him, both acts “impose[d] penalties upon violators of the law” despite there 
being no “link between the United States and the alleged offender,” thus 
completely disregarding “the principles of international law concerning the 
allocation of jurisdiction between the states.”125 
B. Jurisdiction under Customary International Law — Prohibitive Rules 
Some may counter that the above analysis on permissive rules 
misconstrues the legal situation as far as jurisdiction is concerned, as the 
PCIJ actually seemed to take a much more generous view of national 
legislation with an extraterritorial impact.126 Indeed, in its judgment in the 
S.S. “Lotus” case, the court also emphasized that it did “not…follow that 
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own 
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place 
abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international 
law.”127 Instead, the PCIJ explained, “[international law] leaves [States]… 
a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
 
120  Graves, supra note 9, at 736 (regarding ILSA); Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 644–45 (regarding 
the Helms-Burton Act); Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 658–59; Emmenegger & Döbeli, supra note 40, 
at 251. 
121  LIBERTAD Act §§ 301–06. 
122 141 CONG. REC. S15106. 
123  LIBERTAD Act §§ 301–06. 
124  Chichele Professor of Public International Law at the University of Oxford (1999-2012); 
Emeritus Professor of International Law at the University of Oxford since 2012. 
125  Lowe, supra note 14, at 385–86; Davidson, supra note 1, at 1426–27. 
126  Meyer, supra note 13, at 136–37; Emmenegger, supra note 10, at 644. 
127  The court, being evenly divided, required the president to cast the deciding vote. France v. 
Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 32. 
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prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt 
the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”128 
 The difference between the two statements by the PCIJ is clear-cut: 
the first seems to require a permissive rule in international law in order to 
justify extraterritoriality,129 while the second implies the necessity of a 
prohibitive rule in international law to render such legislation unlawful.130 
This crucial distinction in legal reasoning is hardly relevant to the 
United States’ practice. For many years now, states have taken the view 
that the United States’ approach to asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
especially in cases of alleged violations of United States’ embargo and 
sanctions laws, is unlawful.131 Consistent international objections to such 
U.S. actions have not only prevented the creation of a permissive rule but 
have actually led to a customary international law prohibition.132 
In 1982, the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
usually a staunch United States ally, responded to U.S. sanctions targeting 
the proposed Soviet gas pipeline by stating that, “the question is whether 
one very powerful nation can prevent existing contracts being fulfilled; I 
think it is wrong to do that.” 133  Her Trade Secretary, Lord Arthur 
Cockfield, was more blunt, describing the United States’ measures as “an 
unacceptable extension of American extraterritorial jurisdiction which is 
 
128  Id. at 19. 
129  Id. at 18–19. 
130  Id. at 19. 
131  Lew & Nephew, supra note 3, at 142; Larsson, supra note 11, at 24–25, 27; Meng, supra note 
12, at 730–37; Tirkey, supra note 28, at 2; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 655–57; Ziaee, supra note 11, at 
40. 
132  See Charlotte Beaucillon, Practice Makes Perfect, Eventually? Unilateral State Sanctions and 
Extraterritorial Effects of National Legislation, in COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103, 112–18 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 2016); see, e.g., Idriss Jazairy (Special 
Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures), Negative Impact of Unilateral 
Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, ¶¶ 10–11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/46 (July 5, 
2019) [hereinafter Negative Impact]; Idriss Jazairy (Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of 
Unilateral Coercive Measures), Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the 
Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, ¶¶ 52–62, U.N. 
Doc. A/72/370 (Aug. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur]; see also Daniel Franchini, 
‘With Friends Like That, Who Needs Enemies?’: Extraterritorial Sanctions Following the United States’ 
Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Agreement, EJIL: TALK! (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/with-friends-like-that-who-needs-enemies-extraterritorial-sanctions-following-
the-united-states-withdrawal-from-the-iran-nuclear-agreement/; Al Banna, supra note 74, at 68–69; 
Ziaee, supra note 11, at 40; Gordon, supra note 20, at 72–75; Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 2, 86–87, 91–
94 (“emerging rule”); Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 655–57 (“might be argued”); Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Org. (AALCO), Extraterritorial Application of National Legislation: Sanctions Imposed 
Against Third Parties, ¶¶ 64–65 AALCO/58/DAR ES SALAAM/2019/SD/S6 (2019), 
http://www.aalco.int/SG_Brief%20on%20Sanctions-Revised-18.9.2019.pdf.  
133  See generally Gary H. Perlow, Taking Peacetime Trade Sanctions to the Limit: The Soviet 
Pipeline Embargo, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 252, 252–73 (1983) (The Reagan administration 
prevented the sale of United States’ products that would have facilitated construction of the pipeline and 
imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union in response to the alleged Soviet involvement in the Polish 
government’s declaration of martial law); see also James Feron, Mrs Thatcher Faults U.S. on Siberia 
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 2, 1982), at A1. 
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repugnant in international law.”134 Many other European States followed 
suit in condemning U.S. sanctions.135  The European Community (EC) 
declared “that the U.S. regulations, as amended, contain sweeping 
extensions of U.S. jurisdiction which are unlawful under international 
law.”136 
The European Union has repeatedly stressed its opposition to 
extraterritorial sanctions.137 In December 2017, for example, the European 
Union reiterated that it “condemned the extraterritorial application of third-
country legislation imposing restrictive measures which purport to regulate 
the activities of natural and legal persons under the jurisdiction of the 
member States of the European Union, as being in violation of international 
law.”138  
In 2013, the Group of 77, a group of developing States that now has 
134 members,139 and China, adopted a “Ministerial Declaration,” in which 
the States’ foreign ministers “firmly rejected the imposition of laws and 
regulations with extraterritorial impact” because such measures 
“undermine the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations 
and international law” and “also severely threaten the freedom of trade and 
investment.”140 
In 2016, Russia, India, and China issued a joint statement also 
criticizing extraterritorial sanctions as “inconsistent with principles of 
international law.”141 Responding to the threat of U.S. sanctions on foreign 
companies participating in the Nord Stream 2 project, the Austrian and 
German governments issued a joint statement in June 2017: “We cannot 
accept the threat of extraterritorial sanctions, illegal under international 
law, against European companies that participate in developing European 
energy supplies.”142  
 
134  Statement of Lord Cockfield, U.K. Sec’y of State for Trade (Aug. 2, 1982) (published in 21 
International Legal Materials at 851); Davidson, supra note 1, at 1429. 
135  Dunning, supra note 4, at 184–85. 
136  Comments of the European Community, supra note 79, at 1. 
137  Stefan Brocza, The EU Legal Protection System Against the Effects of Extra-territorial 
Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting 
Therefrom, 9 KLRI J. L. LEGIS. 145, 157–62; Developments in the Law – Extraterritoriality, supra note 
35, 1246–50; Graves, supra note 9, at 721–25; Larsson, supra note 11, at 35–36; see also Davidson, 
supra note 1, at 1425–27 (outlining the British position on the matter of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato 
Acts). 
138  Council of the European Union, Sanctions Guidelines – update No. 5664/18 of 4 May 2018. 
139  The Group of 77 at the United Nations, https://www.g77.org/doc/members.html. 
140  Ministerial Declaration from the Group of 77 and China (Sept. 26, 2013) (available at 
http://g77.org/doc/Declaration2013.htm). 
141  Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the 
Republic of India and the People's Republic of China (Apr. 19, 2016), (available at 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1356652.shtml). 
142  The United States opposes the Nord Stream 2 project and seeks to expand these sanctions to 
businesses involved, no matter their nationality. See Daniel Flatley and Dina Khrennikova, U.S. Targets 
Insurers In Latest Round of Nord Steam 2 Sanctions, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2020), 
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In line with this world-wide opposition to the United States’ policy 
on secondary sanctions, the General Assembly of the United Nations has 
passed annual resolutions since 1992 that disapprove of the United States’ 
embargo against Cuba with particular reference to the extraterritorial 
effects of United States’ laws.143 These resolutions have always gained 
overwhelming support.144  
The United States itself has also rejected the legitimacy of secondary 
sanctions in the past.145 In the 1970s, in response to the Arab boycott under 
which American companies were barred from business with Arab states if 
they commercially engaged with Israel, U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus 
Vance, declared “that decisions as to what commerce U.S. firms may or 
may not have with other countries or with other U.S. firms should be made, 
consonant with American policy, by Americans and only Americans.”146 
He went on to emphasize the United States’ “right to regulate, through our 
laws, the activities of our citizens.”147 This sentiment is also reflected in a 
U.S. Senate Committee Report on the proposed amendments to the Export 
Administration Act, which intended to undermine the Arab boycott. In it, 
the Committee stressed that “the United States should not acquiesce in 
attempts by foreign governments through secondary or tertiary boycotts to 
embroil American citizens in their battles against others.”148 
 Considering the near-unanimous consensus as reflected in the 
statements set out above, it is justified that the UN Special Rapporteur 
concluded that “comprehensive coercive measures with extraterritorial 
reach are almost universally rejected as unlawful under international 
law . . . .”149 and that “States should be considered as being under a legal 
 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-11/nord-stream-2-sanctions-to-be-included-in-u-s-
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143  G.A. Res. 74/7, ¶¶ 2–3 (Nov. 12, 2019). 
144  G.A. Res. 74/7, ¶¶ 2–3 (Nov. 12, 2019) (187 states voted in favor with three against and two 
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145 See Fitzgerald, supra note 7, at 48–59, 92; Meyer, supra note 13, at 112; Meyer, supra note 4, 
at 907, 926–27; Ryngaert, supra note 19, at 640–42; see generally Henry J. Steiner, Pressures and 
Principles — The Politics of the Antiboycott Legislation, 8 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L, 529 (1978); 
(describing the legislative battles preceding the Antiboycott Legislation passing and providing many 
examples of leading politicians, lobbyists, and business representatives rejecting the extraterritorial 
nature of the Arab boycott). 
146  Arab Boycott: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
and Urb. Affairs, 95th Cong. 426, 437 (1977) (statement of Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State of the 
United States). 
147  Id. 
148  See S. REP. NO. 95–114, at 20–21 (1977); see also Steiner, supra note 145, at 538. 
149  Negative Impact, supra note 132, at 5, ¶ 10; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra 
note 132, at 17–20. 
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obligation not to recognize as lawful such unilateral coercive measures, 
especially extraterritorial, secondary sanctions.”150 
In sum, there is ample evidence to support the argument that 
customary international law prohibits the extraterritorial application of 
unilateral sanctions based on national legislation to matters that have no 
substantial link to the state passing the legislation. Such legislation violates 
the sovereignty of other States and is therefore unlawful.151 
II. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS TARGETING THIRD STATES ARE UNLAWFUL 
INTERVENTIONS IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THOSE STATES AND 
THEY VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. 
Customary international law prohibits interventions in other states’ 
internal affairs. 152  The 1933 Montevideo Convention includes the 
provision that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external 
affairs of another,”153 and Article 2(7) of the 1945 UN Charter even rules 
out UN intervention in a member state’s internal affairs.154 By the 1960s, 
there was broad international consensus on the prohibition of interventions 
in another state’s internal affairs.155 In 1965, the General Assembly passed 
the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty 
in a 109 to nothing vote, with one abstention. 156  The 1970 General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (Friendly Relations 
Resolution), passed without a vote, reaffirmed the broad consensus on the 
unlawfulness of interventions by confirming that “no State or group of 
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”157 
Although the General Assembly’s resolutions were not legally 
binding, 158  their passage supports the argument that states viewed the 
 
150  Negative Impact, supra note 132, at 5, ¶ 11; see also Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra 
note 132, at 17–20. 
151  Dziggel, supra note 4, at 130, 143; Larsson, supra note 11, at 53; Tirkey, supra note 28, at 2. 
152 See United Kingdom v. Albania, 1949 I.C.J. at 34–35; Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 
¶ 202; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 161–65. 
153  Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 8, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 
19; see also Charter of the Organization of American States art. 19, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 47; The 
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155  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 4, 1965). 
156  G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), at 1 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
157  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 7 (Oct. 4, 1970). 
158  Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumuran, The Theory and Reality of the Sources of 
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 102–03 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 5th ed. 2018). 
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declarations as reflecting international legal rules. 159  In 2005, the ICJ 
confirmed that the Friendly Relations Resolution was “declaratory of 
international law.” 160  The ICJ itself had previously stressed the legal 
quality of the prohibition of such interventions: already in 1949, it declared 
interventions in other states’ affairs to be unlawful. 161  Therefore, the 
prohibition on interventions in the internal or external affairs of another 
state qualifies as a rule of customary international law. 
The ICJ’s 1986 judgment in the Nicaragua Case is frequently cited 
when discussing the prohibition of interventions because the court 
provided a partial definition of its scope.162 Reaffirming the principle of 
non-intervention as a rule of customary international law,163 the ICJ went 
on to define a prohibited intervention: 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty to 
decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and 
cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is 
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which 
must remain free ones.164 
Some claim this reference to “methods of coercion” limits the scope of the 
prohibition. 165  As a result, some scholars conclude that economic 
sanctions, even when targeting third states, do not meet the ICJ’s 
requirement of a coercive element.166 
However, the ICJ stressed it was only looking at “those aspects of 
the principle which appear to be relevant” to the case before it.167 The court 
was dealing with the United States’ massive support of the Nicaraguan 
rebels, the Contras, who were attempting to overthrow their country’s 
 
159  The United States Representative to the United Nations at the time said the resolution had “the 
precise job of enunciating that law” as far as non-intervention was concerned. See Robert Rosenstock, 
The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 713, 714–15, 726–29 (1971); see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 70. 
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161  United Kingdom v. Albania, 1949 I.C.J. at 34–35. 
162  See Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14. The case was initiated by Nicaragua. Id. It 
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Measures: Legitimate Enforcement or Illegitimate Intervention?, 16 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 175 (2017); 
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22 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 30 NO. 1 
 
government by force. There was no need to explore the issue of “coercion” 
in any detail. The United States’ involvement in the rebels’ use of force 
was undoubtedly coercive regarding Nicaragua’s government system.168 
The fact the ICJ did not provide a more concise definition of 
prohibited interventions does not mean that lesser coercive means are 
permissible. Rather, the difference between coercive intervention and 
potentially permissible interference comes down to whether the target state 
retains its freedom to choose in matters related to its sovereignty. Thus, an 
intervention is unlawful when the target state risks losing its freedom to act 
on an issue related to its internal and/or external affairs. In contrast, actions 
below that threshold, aiming at persuasion rather than compulsion, may 
well be permissible.169 
Applying these parameters to the United States’ practice of 
extraterritorial application of unilateral secondary sanctions reveals this to 
be unlawful intervention. 170  As the ICJ stressed in Nicaragua, “the 
formulation of foreign policy” is a matter “in which each State is permitted, 
by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.”171 Moreover, the 
fact that the “capacity to enter into relations with other states” is widely 
perceived to be a requirement of statehood reinforces the argument that a 
state’s ability to conduct its foreign policy freely is a vital element of its 
sovereignty.172 
By targeting other states’ businesses and citizens who do not adhere 
to U.S. sanctions laws, the United States coerces them into undermining 
their home state’s foreign policy.173 This in turn effectively coerces those 
states to abandon their foreign policy.174 For example, in response to the 
Helms-Burton-Act, the First Secretary (Trade Policy) at the United 
Kingdom Embassy in Washington D.C., declared the act to be “an 
unwelcome and objectionable attempt to substitute the foreign and trade 
policies of the U.S. Congress for those of foreign sovereign 
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governments.”175 The D’Amato Act met a similarly cool reception, as it 
effectively instructed the United States’ president “to act as a world 
policeman, imposing US law upon every person and every place on the 
planet.”176 
This tendency to interfere in other States’ foreign policies is also 
evident in the case of Iran: all the other signatories of the JCPOA wish to 
uphold the agreement, which the United States has renounced. 177 
Therefore, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the European Union, 
China, and Russia are encouraging their business communities to 
strengthen commercial ties with Iran in order to ensure Iran’s continuing 
compliance with the agreement. 178  Meanwhile, the United States is 
attempting to undermine these States’ foreign policy choices by 
threatening their businesses and citizens with the prosecution, forcing them 
to comply with U.S. policy decisions.179 A similar situation is developing 
in relation to the Nord Stream 2 project, which is supposed to enable the 
delivery of gas from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. 180  U.S. 
authorities, wishing to undermine German government policy in favor of 
the project, are targeting German and third state companies to persuade 
them to withdraw from the project.181 
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There have been belated attempts by the European Union and others 
at introducing legislation to stop domestic businesses from complying with 
U.S. legislation.182 These have proven to be ineffective due to the United 
States’ economic power.183 Moreover, the United States has succeeded in 
stoking fear among foreign business executives who risk being arrested in 
the United States or abroad in the case of non-compliance with the United 
States’ sanctions laws.184 Since U.S. courts now assume jurisdiction on the 
flimsy grounds of the involvement, at some point, of a “correspondent 
account” in the United States, meaning that the clearance of a transaction 
in the United States between two foreign banks situated abroad is sufficient 
to criminalize non-resident foreign actors, 185  the ineffectiveness of 
blocking instruments is unsurprising. Thus, the United States’ approach 
has not only brought the JCPOA “to the brink of collapse,”186 but the 
subsequent decision by European businesses to quit Iran “has revealed an 
uncomfortable truth to European policymakers, namely that those 
companies are effectively regulated in Washington, D.C.”187 
The United States’ secondary sanctions violate the prohibition on 
the intervention in other states’ affairs by effectively coercing them into 
abandoning their own foreign policy. 188  As the Dean of the Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law, Austen Parrish, has commented, the 
United States’ practice of “unilateral extraterritoriality has served as a tool 
for empire-building.”189 
Furthermore, U.S. secondary sanctions violate the principle of 
sovereign equality of states, enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter.190 
The way the United States applies its sanctions laws shows complete 
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disregard for other states’ right to pursue an independent foreign policy.191 
The United States utilizes its economic might to force other countries to 
follow the United States’ foreign policy by threatening third state 
businesses and individuals and thus rendering their home states’ foreign 
policy ineffective.192 The re-imposition of sanctions against Iran illustrates 
that—while the United Kingdom, France, and Germany wanted to adhere 
to the agreement with Iran, almost all these states’ businesses, including 
major corporations, pulled out of negotiations or even cancelled 
agreements they had already concluded in/with Iran. 193  These states 
therefore were forced to watch their foreign policy goals crumble. 194 
Passing blocking statutes at the European Union level, which make it 
unlawful for businesses in the European Union to comply with the United 
States’ sanctions, proves to be a blunt instrument.195 It is almost impossible 
to ascertain whether a company has withdrawn from its Iran business in 
order to comply with U.S. sanctions or whether there are sound business 
reasons for doing so.196 This exodus of third states’ businesses, however, 
fatally undermines their respective nation’s foreign policy initiatives.197 
The United States’ sanctions laws therefore effectively compel third, 
economically less powerful states to abandon their independent foreign 
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policy. 198  As Federica Mogherini, the European Union’s former High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stated, this is 
unacceptable: “We Europeans cannot accept that a foreign power – even 
our closest friend and ally – makes decisions over our legitimate trade with 
another country. This is a basic element of sovereignty . . . .”199 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. sanctions laws and their consequences for third states are 
incompatible with public international law. By assuming jurisdiction and 
enforcing its domestic legislation in cases with no relevant connection to 
the United States, the United States violates customary international law 
on jurisdiction and other States’ sovereignty, which includes the right to 
govern to the exclusion of other States. By intimidating foreign businesses 
and citizens so that they do not enter into commercial transactions that may 
violate the United States’ sanctions laws, the United States imposes its 
foreign policy on other States. The United States is thus unlawfully 
intervening in matters, which, as the ICJ pointed out, every state is entitled 
to “decide freely.”200 By utilizing its economic strength in order to impose 
its will on third states, the United States also disregards the principle of 
sovereign equality. As one observer commented more than 20 years ago, 
United States’ sanctions policy “does little to reassure those who think that 
many members of the United States’ Congress do not understand 
international law at all, but see the world as one great federal state with the 
United States filling the role of the federal government.” 201  This 
corresponds with Austen Parrish’s conclusion that the United States views 
“the use of national law, applied extraterritorially, as a way to displace 
international law.”202  
At a time when the United States’ power is in relative decline, it is 
likely that other powerful states will implement similar sanctions policies 
in the future.203 One can only speculate what the United States’ reaction 
would be should China secure the arrest of a U.S. businessperson 
somewhere in Asia for engaging in dealings with Taiwan, similar to the 
United States’ conduct in Reza Zarrab’s or Meng Wanzhou’s cases. Based 
on its reaction to the Arab boycott in the 1970s, it seems probable that the 
United States would not consider such conduct lawful under public 
international law. Therefore, the United States’ strategy of imposing its 
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foreign policy on other states by targeting them with secondary sanctions 
will fail.204  
The United States’ withdrawal from JCPOA evidences this failure: 
not only is the United States now isolated in its Iran policy,205 but Iran has 
made considerable progress in its nuclear program since the United States 
abandoned the agreement.206 The lesson seems to be this: there will always 
be disagreements between states, even between allies. Nonetheless, states 
are more likely to achieve policy goals in cooperation, not in opposition, 
to one another. 
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